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I.

INTRODUCTION

A photograph of a girl holding a shivering, oil-soaked duck
and pleading, "Don't die, Ducky, don't die . . ." highlighted a
recent full page advertisement in the New York Times.' The ad,
placed by the citizens of St. Petersburg, Florida, after an oil spill
had fouled the beaches near their city, indicates the growing
anxiety of coastal communities over the menace of oil pollution
of the oceans.
Similar concerns have been expressed on a variety of issues
on campuses and communities across the nation in a host of
activities culminating recently with "Earth Day," on April 22.2
The focus, though occasionally global, is primarily domestic, and
the tone justifiably frantic, but many presentations are
balanced-the issues are well-articulated, alternatives scientifically
assessed, and recommendations for action are emerging.3 In any
event, the objective is "to bring home the facts of the
environmental crisis," and to stir further demands for action.
"What action?" is the skeptic's rejoinder. One could perhaps
argue that sincerity of purpose, without sustained efforts over a
long period, is not likely to result in a dramatic restoration of the
balance of nature or in providing answers to the mounting
problems caused by water and air pollution and the growing
population spiral. He might support his contention by forwarding,
among others, the following reasons: 1) The sheer magnitude of
* Associate Professor and Director, International Legal Studies, University of Denver
Law Center.
** J.D., 1969, University of Denver College of Law.
1. N.Y. Times, March 12, 1970, at 35.
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, April 22, 1970, at 29; id., April 23, 1970, at 1, col. 3, 30,
col. I and 31, col. 1; Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 1970, at 1, col. 2, 3.
3. See, e.g., SATURDAY REviEw, May 2, 1970, at 53-68; id., March 7, 1970, at 4766; 3 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, March 1970, at 20, 31, 54, 58, 5 TRAIL 8-28 (Aug.-Sept.,
1969), Kennan, To Prevent a World Wasteland: A Proposal,48 FN. AFFAIRS 401 (1970);
SOVIET LIFE, Jan. 1970, at 26-62; See also, THE ENVIRONMENTAL HANDBOOK (G. Bell ed.
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the problems is staggering, especially when their nature and
origin, and the various scientific, technological and biological,
social and legal aspects are not even properly understood; 2)
Competing and conflicting interests in society will not necessarily
allow decison-making to be ecologically oriented; and 3) Too
many environmental problems, by their very nature, cut across
nation state lines and thus are not amenable to haphazard
responses under a nation state system which is totally ineffective,
almost archaic in dealing with problems which demand an
immediate and concerted action. A case in point is the pollution
of the sea, some aspects of which, especially those dealing with
areas adjacent to coasts, will be discussed in this paper.
II.

THE PROBLEM

The Torrey Canyon disaster4 and the more recent oil well
blowouts in Santa Barbara 5 and the Gulf of Mexico' have
highlighted three problem areas: 1)The nature of laws, regulations
and procedures to provide for the optimum preventative steps to
avert this kind of disaster; 2) The nature and effectiveness of the
prescribing, applying, and enforcing machinery; and 3) Scientific
and technological expertise and institutional structures necessary
for restorative purposes, once such a disaster occurs. Above all,
mineral resource exploitation should be carried out primarily with
an overriding awareness of the environmental well-being.
This paper will briefly discuss the responses of the United
States in the Santa Barbara and the Gulf cases, examining both
the executive and the legislative action; it will analyze the
institutional and procedural aspects of the United States
responses, and evaluate their efficacy in view of their likely
influence upon other states and international organizations
involved in handling the pollution aspects of the sea. The problem
of pollution from 'tankers, which has been examined elsewhere,
will not be the focus of the present inquiry.'
4. See, e.g., E. COWAN, THE TORREY CANYON DISASTER (1968); Nanda, The "Torrey
Canyon" Disaster:Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENVER L.J. 400 (1967).
5. See infra notes 48-128 and the accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 129-142 and the accompanying text.
7. See Nanda, supra note 4.
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III.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The world's need for oil and natural gas is increasing at an
accelerating rate. Presently, oil and gas supply most of the world's
energy needs, and will in all probability continue to do so. For
instance, oil and gas supply over 74 percent of the needs of the
United States, the world's greatest consumer of energy, which in
1967 consumed 4.7 billion barrels of oil.' By the year 2000, the
United States energy needs are projected to triple and, while an
increased use of nuclear energy is envisaged, petroleum demand is
still expected to more than double in this period.9 Most experts
agree that a large part of this increasing demand will be met from
ocean reserves. For instance, while in 1967 the oceans supplied
about 12 percent of the oil and 10 percent of the gas to meet
United States needs, 10 the percentage is expected to rise
considerably."1 Although there is disagreement on how
substantially this increased demand might affect offshore
production (estimates range from doubling to quadrupling the
output), it is generally accepted that there will be a significant
2
increase in oceanic oil and gas activity in the next decade.'
Presently offshore activities are in progress adjacent to 35
3
countries; 15 more are expected to start exploration soon.
Undoubtly nations will further encourage exploration and
exploitation to both supply domestic energy needs and provide
revenue from such production. The corporations involved will
probably be diligent in their efforts to maximize profits by
keeping costs down.' 4 This could well lead to a lack of adequate
8. Hearingson S. 1219 Before the Subcomm..on Minerals, Materials,and Fuels of
the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 88
[hereinafter cited as Senate Hearingson S. 1219].
9. Id. See also, NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, PETROLEUM RESOURCES UNDER
THE OCEAN FLOOR 90 (1969); J. WINGER, J. EMMERSON AND E. GUNNING, OUrLOOK FOR
ENERGY INTHE UNITED STATES (1968).
10. NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, supra note 9, at 18.
11. 68 OIL& GAS J., March 16, 1970, at 123, 126.

12. Present world wide production from offshore areas is about 7 million barrels a
day, or 17 percent of world output. Predictions vary from 20 million barrels a day by 1980
to 40 million barrels a day by 1984. Other estimates by experts in industry vary between
25 and 28 million barrels a day for 1980. However, all agree that there will be a
tremendous increase in offshore activity. Supra note 11, at 126-27.

13. Senate Hearingson S.1219, at 9.
14. Hearingson S.7 and S.544 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of
the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-2, pt. 4, at 988-89
(1969).

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

concern for not only the effects of pollution but equally for
aesthetic well-being as well as a total environmental balance, two
considerations which rise above economics. Additionally, there
may be conflicting interests involved-those of the oil industry
may be antithetical not only to mineral resource exploitation, but
one must also take into account other uses of the oceans such as
fishing, transportation and tourism.
IV.

PAST TRENDS

The exploitation of offshore oil and gas deposits is a recent
phenomenon. While it had been long suspected that there were
enormous petroleum resources along the continental shelves, there
was little effort or possibility to exploit them until the mid1950's. 15 After World War II there was great interest in the
offshore areas, but activity was hampered by legal battles between
the states and the federal government concerning the ownership of
the continental shelf. The Submerged Lands Act in 195311 more
or less resolved the dispute and cleared the way for exploration
and exploitation.
The growth of the petroleum industry on the continental
shelves has been tremendous; from none in 1953, the production
has risen to about 17 percent of the world's entire output of
petroleum, and is projected to supply 30 to 35 percent of it by
1980.17 The growth and spread of these activities has been
impressive and the United States is by no means alone in these
ventures. For instance, in the 1950's all activity was centered in
the Gulf of Mexico,"8 but by 1960 three more areas were being
explored-the Persian Gulf, the Gulf of Paria, and the Sea of
Japan. 9 At the beginning of 1970, almost 200 mobile drilling rigs
are exploring every body of water in the world in search of oil.20
The last 15 years have seen the birth and development of a
2
complex multibillion dollar industry. '
15. 58 OIL & GAS J., June 6, 1960, at 100.
16. The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964).
17. MEMORANDUM BY SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., SELECTED
MATERIALS ON THE OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF

44 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited

as SELECTED MATERIALS ON THE OCS].

18.
19.
20.
21.

58 OIL & GAS J., June 6, 1960, at 100.
64 OIL & GAS J., June 20, 1966, at 109, 110.
Supra note I1, at 123-29.
Id.
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United States offshore activities are primarily governed by
the Submerged Lands Act, 22 and the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act.? However, in these two Acts Congress did no more
than provide broad guidelines for the development of the
continental shelf, while delegating the actual regulation of the
exploration and exploitation to the Secretary of the Interior. The
Submerged Lands Act set the seaward boundary of the coastal
states to their "historic boundaries," but no farther than three
miles from the line of mean high tide on the Atlantic and Pacific
coasts, and three marine leagues in the Gulf of Mexico. This was
to set at rest competing claims between the states and the federal
24
government in coastal waters, the so-called "tidelands" dispute.
The Supreme Court has recognized an historic boundary of three
marine leagues (10 1/2 geographic miles) for Texas and the west
coast of Florida.2 However, there is still some conflict over coast
2
line demarcations, especially in Louisiana.
Under the statutes, the Secretary of the Interior is to
administer the leasing operations. 2 7 He is to prescribe the
necessary leasing and conservation rules and regulations, which he
is authorized to amend at any time "as he determines to be
necessary and proper in order to provide for the prevention of
waste and conservation of the natural resources of the outer
continental shelf. ' 28 He is authorized to regulate or suspend
hazardous operations,2' or suspend operations in the interests of
preservation."
Any person who knowingly violates any rule or regulation of
the Secretary pertaining to waste, conservation or correlative
rights, is guilty of a misdemeanor which carries a fine of up to
$2000 or a sentence of six months.3 ' Each day of violation is a
22. The Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1301-1315 [hereinafter cited as
Submerged Lands Act].
23. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1331-1343 [hereinafter

cited as OCS Land Act].
24. For a short history, see SELECTED MATERIALS ON THE OCS supra note 17, at V.
25. Id.
26. Hearingson S.7 and S.544 Before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of
the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 91-2, pt.3, at 794, 796
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Hearingson S.7 and S.544].
27. OCS Lands Act § 1334 (a)(l).

28. Id.
29. Id.

30. Id.
31. Id.,(a)(2).
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separate offense. The issuance and continuance of any lease is

conditioned upon compliance with the regulations in force and
effect on the date of the issuance of the lease.3 The Secretary is

further authorized to prescribe rental provisions for a lease and
any other terms and provisions.?
Thus, by the direction of Congress the exploitation of
minerals on the outer continental shelf became an administrative
function of the Secretary of the Interior. In order to administer
his charge, the Secretary divided the outer continental shelf into

four administrative areas: the Gulf Coast Region, the West Coast
Region, the Eastern Region and the Alaskan Region. 34 A general

code of regulations, contained in the Code of Federal Regulations,
was drawn up to embrace all four regions.With regard to pollution and conservation, these regulations

require that an operator submit a development and drilling
program for approval before he is allowed to begin any work.3 1
He must use reasonable means to keep wells under control; 37 he
32. Id.
33. OCS Lands Act § 1337 (b)(4).
34. Hearingson S.7 andS.544, at 752-53.
35. Oil and Gas and Sulphur Operations in the Continental Shelf, 30 CFR Chapter
II, part 250 [hereinafter cited as Title 30]; Outer Continental Shelf Mineral Deposits, 43
CFR Chapter II, Part 3380 [hereinafter cited as Title 43]. On May 7, 1969, the Secretary
proposed amendments to this part to clarify and prescribe specific standards of compliance
with the general operating regulations applicable to oil and gas and sulphur operations on
all these areas. 34 Fed. Reg. 7381-7385.
36. Title 30 § 250.34:
Drilling and development programs. (a) Prior to the beginning of any
operations on the lease, including the construction of drilling or production
platforms or other structures, the lessee shall submit to the supervisor for
approval an acceptable plan for the performance of such work. . . (b) After
a discovery has been made on the lease, the lessee shall submit to the
supervisor a plan of development for the lease or field. ...
37. Title 30 § 250.40:
Control of wells. (a) The lessee shall take all reasonable precautions for
keeping all wells under control at all times and shall provide at the time any
well is started the proper high-pressure fittings and equipment as the supervisor
may prescribe or approve. A conductor string of casing must be cemented
throughout its length, and all strings of casing must be securely cemented and
anchored unless other procedure is authorized or prescribed by the supervisor.
(b) The lessee shall take all reasonable precautions to prevent any well from
blowing open and shall take immediate steps and exercise due diligence to
bring under control any such well. Storm chokes or similar safety devices shall
be installed in any well capable of flowing oil or gas: Provided, that if in the
opinion of the Supervisor, upon a clear showing by the lessee, a storm choke

1970]

OFFSHORE OIL SPILLS

must not "pollute the waters of the high seas or damage the

aquatic life of the sea or allow extraneous matter to enter and
damage any mineral or water-bearing formation;" 3 he must give
notices and reports on each individual well;39 he must furnish a log
and history of each well,40 and must submit a monthly report of
all operations.41 Also, the Secretary is authorized to inspect any

and all facilities .12
Within the guidelines set out in these regulations, the
Regional Oil and Gas Supervisor had broad powers to issue
supplemental rules and in some cases to waive certain
requirements for operations in his region.4 3 This type of discretion
would allow each Regional Director to regulate activities, thus
meeting the needs and requirements of each oil field or each
individual well."
Pursuant to these regulations, by January 31, 1969, over
11,000 wells had been drilled on the federal lands of the outer

continental shelf.4 5 There were 23 blowouts," one of which, the
or similar safety device is not needed for the protection of the well or is likely
to cause damage to or loss of the well, the Supervisor is authorized to waive
this requirement. [19 Fed. Reg. 2656, May 8, 1954, as amended at 25 Fed.
Reg. 637, Jan. 26, 1960]
38. Title 30 § 250.42.
39. Title 30 § 250.91. Notices and reports pertain to a notice of intention to drill;
notice of intention to change the condition of a well; subsequent report of changing the
condition of a well; notice of intention to abandon well; subsequent report of abandonment.
40. Title 30 § 250.92.
41. Title 30 § 250.93.
42. Title43 § 3387.3-3.
43. Title 30 § 250.11, 12; 67 OIL & GAS J., Feb. 17, 1969, at 63. See also, Hearings
on S.7 andS.544, at 1026.
44. Title 30 § 250.11, 12; see also OCS Orders No. 1-9 issued for the Pacific Region;
Hearingson S.7 and S.544, at 781-788.
45. Hearings on S.7 and S.544, at 990. There is some variance in the number of
offshore wells drilled, depending upon the square. For example, in a statement by U.S.
Representative McKelvey before the Economic and Technical Subcommittee of the U.N.
Committee on the Peaceful uses of the seabed and ocean floor beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, March 20, 1969, contained in Subsea Mineral Resources and Problems
Related to their Development (Geological Survey Circular 619, 1969) at 19, the number
of wells is given at 7,642 as of January 21, 1969. Dr. William T. Pecora, Director, USGS,
has stated that 10,243 wells were dug on Federal OCS lands, Hearings on S.7 and S.544,
at 961. Solanas, Regional Oil and Gas Supervisor, Pacific Region puts the figure at 6,500
wells Hearingson S.7 andS.544 at 797, while Mr. Udall, Former Secretary of the Interior,
speaks of 12-14,000 holes drilled prior to the Santa Barbara lease sale. Hearings on S.7
andS.544, at 1288.
46. Hearings on S.7 and .S.544 at 1026-28. The list of blowouts from the USGS
includes only those cases where well control was lost during drilling and workover
operations. Blowouts caused by collison, hurricanes, etc. are not included.
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Santa Barbara Spill, was considered to be very serious. In
coastal states have adopted
addition to the federal regulations,
4
codes for their offshore areas. 1
A.

Santa BarbaraBlowout

The federal government offered oil and gas leases for sale in
the Santa Barbara Channel on February 6, 1968, despite
considerable local opposition. 4 Following its normal procedure,
the Interior Department allowed the oil industry to conduct
exploration in the proposed areas before bidding on the leases."
The Channel leases brought the government a record
$602,719,261.60 in bonus monies for 71 leases representing
363,181 acresY° Earlier in December 1966, a 1,995-acre tract of
federal lands in the Channel had already been leased for
$21,189,000.51 The area in which the blowout took place was tract
402 for which four corporations, Union, Texaco, Gulf and Mobil,
had joined to bid $61.4 million, the largest amount offered for a
52
Santa Barbara Channel lease.
The Union Oil Company was responsible for the drilling
program in tract 402. Platform A, approximately six miles off the
coast of California,5 3 was to be used for extensive drilling. 4 A
development and drilling plan was submitted to the Regional
Director and, after consultation, was approved.5 5 The drilling
plan, which was later criticized, apparently caused no technical
difficulties until the fifth hole, which blew out.5" The blowout was
quickly controlled with blowout prevention equipment which is
required on all offshore wells.57 However, the complex geological
47. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 6871-6878 (West Supp. 1969); See also
Hearingson S.7 andS.54 at 1025.
48. Hearings on S.7 and S.544, at 1285, 1291.
49. Id. at 704, 787, 812, 1283.

50. Id. at 793.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 552. See also 67 OIL & GAS J., Feb. 10, 1969, at 50.
53. Hearingson S. 1219, at 61; Hearings on S.7 andS.544, at 544-46.
54. Hearings on S.7 and S.544 at 584, 813. Multiple holes from one platform or
drilling rig is the rule in offshore work. Some of the newer designs can accommodate 32
or more drill holes. WORLD OIL, OFFSHORE HANDBOOK, at 24,'50, 60 (1969).
55, Hearingson S.7 andS.544, at 592-605, 685, 797.
56. Id. at 552-53. See also 67 OIL & GAS J., Feb. 10, 1969, at 50-51.
57. Hearings on S.7 and S.544, at 579 (Daily Drilling Record of the well that blew

out.)
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formations of the Santa Barbara Channel, 8 more specifically, a

combination of two factors-enormous pressures from the oil and
gas deposits beneath the ocean beds, and the faulted nature of the
strata above them59 allowed oil and gas to leak out of the drill hole
and find its way to the surface.
The blowout preventors (BOPs) operate on the assumption

that the only way oil can get out of the ground is through the well
head. The oil can thus be turned off and on like a water faucet.

This assumption proved wrong in this case. The situation that
Union Oil faced would be analogous to a man turning off a water
faucet and finding water leaking out of the walls.

The amount of oil spilled, in what was termed the worst oil
pollution disaster in the continental United States," was initially

placed somewhere between 6,000 and 78,000.barrels depending
upon the source of information,6 and the oil continued to escape
58. Hearings on S.7 and S.544, at 338, 571, 677, 634-36. See also 67 OIL & GAS J.
Feb. 10, 1969, at 50-51; Hearingson S.1219 at 35. Apparently the federal government was
unaware of the particular geological circumstances of the Santa Barbara Channel at the
time the leases were let. Also, no public hearings were held in Santa Barbara at that time.
Hearings on S.1219. at 13. See, e.g., Pauley Petroleum, Inc.'s petition for damages in the
U.S. Court of Claims contending that:
(1)The United States knew or should have known that the Santa Barbara
Channel area was characterized by deeper water, greater tectonic activity, a
great density of subsurface faults and fault zones, and more frequent nd more
intense earthquake and other seismic activity than most, if not all, other areas
in which offshore exploration for and production of oil and gas had theretofore
been attempted and that each of these conditions increased the likelihood of
well blowouts, pipline breakage, and other causes of inadvertent spillage or
seepage of oil***. (Pauley petition, par. 13.) It was generally understood in
the petroleum industry that the possibility of well blowouts is, roughly
inversely proportional to the available knowledge with respect to subsurface
geologic conditions and that the geologic knowledge of the subsurface geologic
conditions and that the geologic knowledge of the subsurface Outer
Continental Shelf areas under the waters of the Santa Barbara Channel was
even more sketchy and uncertain than the geologic knowledge available with
respect to onshore oil-producing areas and most other submarine offshore oilproducing areas in the United States. (Pauley petition, Par. 14.)
59. See, e.g., statement of Charles A. O'Brien, Chief Deputy Attorney General, State
of California, Hearings on S.1219, at 30, 35: "We are dealing with a geological area in
which faults come at the strangest angles, in which the encrustation sedimentary cap is
extremely weak, and the fact that it might not occur in one area is no assurance whatsoever
that it could not approach in others ....
60. Id. at 30.
61. The estimates of the amount of oil which seeped out vary greatly. For example,
in a statement before the Economic and Technical Subcommittee of the UN Committee
on the Peaceful uses of the Seabed and Ocean floor Beyond the Limits of National
Jurisdiction, March 20, 1969, U.S. representative McKelvey said: "The spill probably
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from the ruptured well for about four months after the blowout."
The fight to halt the oil and leak and clean up the resulting mess
was long and expensive. Union Oil claimed to have spent
$4,600,000 in the first five weeks of restorative operations6 3 The
amount of damages to third parties and to the environment is still
being hotly debated."
The two contributing factors in causing the blowout should
be noted: 1) The federal regulations were perhaps inadequate;
according to the executive officer in charge of California's State
Land Commission, compliance with the state regulations could
have prevented this occurrence; 2) It was perhaps an unsound
decision by federal authorities not to require an intermediate
string of casing at the 1,000 or 1,200 foot zone.
B. PoliticalandRegulatory Results
The political and regulatory activities which followed the
Santa Barbara oil spill were rapid and often overlapping. The
federal response was divided between the Executive and the
Legislative branches. Within the Executive there was action by
both the President and the Secretary of the Interior. Legislative
action was split between the House and the Senate. There was also
activity at the state level even though the incident took place on
federal lands.
Within a few days of the blowout the Secretary of the
Interior, Walter Hickel, had made an inspection of the Santa
Barbara Channel. 6 He imposed a "temporary drilling
amounts to only 3,000-6,000 barrels or so." Subsea Mineral Resources and Problems
Related to their Development 19, 21 (Geological Survey Circular 619, 1969). See also
Hearingson S.1219, at 146, where the amount is placed "conservatively" at 78,000 barrels

by the 100th day; and at 16 (Statement of former Senator Kuchel); and at 44, 48
(statement of Dole, an Assistant Secretary of the Interior).
62. Supra note 59, at 32:
One hundred and twelve days after the blowout, oil continues to escape from

the ocean floor at the rate of at least 1,000 gallons per day. When will it stop?
I know of no answer. Virtually every control method known has been
attempted. There have been booms, and divers, and funnels, and two-man
submarines, and dispersants and powdered cement diatomaceous earth, and
perhaps other substances cast into, upon, or below the waters to stop the leak.

It continues.
63. 67 OIL & GAS J., Aug. 25, 1969, at 33.
64. Various claims amounting to in excess of 1 1/2 billion dollars have been filed. A
list of claims filed is set out in Hearingson S.1219, at 58, 59.

65. Id. at 18.
66. 67 OIL & GAS J., February 10, 1967, at 50.
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moratorium" on existing drilling operations in the Channel and
placed a total ban on new drilling.67 There was also a temporary
ban upon production 8 except in the area around the blowout. 9
Here Union was allowed to draw off oil and gas in an effort to
reduce the pressure of the reservoir and slow down the rate of the
leak. 7 The total production prohibition was lifted after the United
States Geological Survey (USGS) personnel inspected the
facilities. 7 However, after five days, the Secretary decided that
there was a lack of sufficient geologic data for the area and
ordered, on February 7, a halt to all drilling and production
in which
activities in the areas under federal jurisdiction, an order
72
concurred.
Justice
of
Department
the
and
the President
Ten days later, on the 17th of February, the Secretary
announced new, tighter interpretations of previous regulations
concerning pollution,7 a moratorium on all offshore leasing, 74 and
a proposed set of drilling and leasing rules, which were more
stringent. 75 The thrust of the pollution rules was to impose strict
and unlimited liability for any oil spill. 71 It was a moot point as
to whether this rule applied to Union Oil as Union had already
stated that it would bear the costs of any cleanup that was
necessary. 77 Other oil companies complained that this was a new
rule and that they were not bound by it, as it had not been in
effect when they bought their leases. 78 This was disputed by the,
Secretary who said it was not79 a new rule but only a clarification
of the existing pollution rules.
The moratorium on offshore leasing was to continue until
new drilling and leasing regulations were drawn up and adopted. 0
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Hearingson S.7 andS.544, at 943; Hearingson S.1219, at 44.
73. Department of Interior News Release, contained in Hearings on S.7 and S.544,
at 1028.
74. 67 OIL & GAS J., Feb. 24, 1969, at 44.
75. Id. These rules were put into operation as OCS Order No. 10, on March 28, 1969.
Hearings on S.1219, at 49; Hearingson S.7 and S.544, at 976.
76. Supra note 73. See also 67 OIL & GAS J., Feb. 24, 1969, at 44.

77. 67 OIL& GAS J., Feb. 10, 1969, at 51. See also Hearingson S.7 and S.544, at
967.
78. Hearingson S.7 andS.544, at 967.

79. Id. at 973.
80. 67 OIL & GAS J.,Feb. 24, 1969, at 44.
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The proposed drilling regulations were the outcome of a safety
review of all outer continental shelf regulations initiated by
Secretary Hickel after the blowout, and dealt with casing
requirements, variances, drilling mud standards, blowout
prevention devices and other technical matters." The oil industry
was given two days to present written comments on the proposed
rules.12 California state oil and gas officials were also requested
to review the revised procedures and regulations.8 Additionally,
geological survey earth scientists and a panel of scientists named
by the President's science adviser conducted further inquiries and
84
studies.
Meanwhile, the drilling and production ban in the Channel
was causing complications. The operators were incurring
estimated losses of $100,000 a day because of idled equipment.
Further, some experts contended that production from the area of
the leaking well would be necessary to reduce the oil spill.8
Phillips Petroleum asked for a five-day production permit to
prevent damage to their wells. 7 Both of these production requests
were granted.88 More recently, Secretary Hickel has declared a
lease moratorium off Santa Barbara. 9
The Secretary remained active. On March 3 a new buffer
zone was announced for the Santa Barbara Channel. 0 The lands
named were withdrawn from mineral leasing and made a part of
an ecological reserve.91 The Secretary commented publicly that
there was serious consideration of canceling the Union Oil lease
on Block 402 along with adjoining Block 401 and including these
lands in the new buffer zone. On March 28, the new drilling
regulations for the Santa Barbara Channel were released.9 3 There
was little adverse reaction to the new drilling rules. Operators felt
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Id.
Hearingson S.1219, at 45.
Id.

85. 67 OIL & GAS J., Feb. 24, 1969, at 59.
86. Id., March 17, 1969, at 49.
87. Id.

88. Id.
89. 68 OIL & GAS J., March 2, 1970, at 31.

90.
91.
92.
93.

Hearingson S.7 and S.544, at 980; Hearingson S.1219, at 3.
Id.
67 OIL GAS J., March 31, 1969, at 36.
Hearingson S.1219, at 49.
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that they were "workable" but foresaw a 15 percent increase in
drilling costs, a matter of between $15,000 and $20,000 per well
in their Channel operations.9 4
However, a much different reaction was generated by the oil
industry on May 7 when the Secretary proposed new rules for the
entire outer continental shelf.95 In addition to more rigid drilling
requirements, the proposed rules sharply reduced the discretionary
powers of the regional officials, required the oil companies to
disclose a great deal more of their geologic data prior to lease
sales, and provided for making this hitherto confidential
information public." The latter two provisions caused most of the
97
criticism.
After much discussion the new rules for the outer continental
shelf were adopted on August 22.1 As compared with the earlier
regulations, they were much stricter, especially in the areas of
pollution prevention and environmental protection. For example,
as foreshadowed in the earlier proposals,99 they provided that in
the case of pollution damaging or threatening to damage any
phase of the environment, the lessee must control and remove the
pollutant at his own expense wherever it may be."'0 Also, before
a lease is offered for sale, there will be consideration of all
environmental factors.10 1 To this end public hearings may be held
together with consultation with state agencies and interested
organizations and individuals.10 2 To prevent pollution, stiffer
technical requirements for well drilling, casing, cementing, mud
control and blowout prevention equipment were enacted.1 13 The
following week the detailed regulations for the Gulf Region were
published.104
In November the Interior Department released its report on
94. 67 OIL & GAS J., March 31, 1969, at 37.
95. Hearingson S. 1219, at 178.

96. Id.
97. For some examples of industry criticism, see 67 OIL & GAs J., June 9, 1969, at
48; June 16, 1969, at 45; July 14, 1969, at 44; Aug. 4, 1969, at 75, 100.
98. Department of the Interior News Release, August 22, 1969; Revised Title 30 and
43 CFR, Aug. 22, 1969; 67 OIL & GAs J., Aug. 25, 1969, at 52.
99. See supra note 95.
100. Revised Title 30 CFR § 250.43.
101. Revised Title 43 CFR § 3380.
102. Id.
103. Revised Title 30 CFR § 250.30, 34, 38, 41.
104. Department of the Interior News Release, August 28, 1969. OCS Orders Nos.
1 through 10, Gulf of Mexico, Aug. 28, 1969. For the anticipated effect of the new rules
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the Santa Barbara Channel." 5 At the same time the Secretary
announced that there would be no lease sales at all in the Channel,
but he was approving full production of the controversial Union
Oil lease."' This move had been recommended by the Presidential
panel as a means of stopping oil seepage in the blowout area. 7
Immediately after the blowout on January 28, the Secretary
of the Interior suggested to the President that he order his own
independent investigation of the oil spill problem. 8 On February
11, President Nixon ordered that a special panel be convened to
conduct an extensive study. Their probe began on the 24th of that
month. 0 1 On June 9, the President's panel released some
preliminary studies with specific suggestions for the Santa
Barbara problem.' 0 They released their formal reports in the
latter part of October, one on the oil spills,"' and the other on
2
the entire question of marine resources."
Both houses of Congress conducted investigations on the
Santa Barbara incident, as part of their wider discussion on
pending water pollution bills. The House Committee on Public
Works heard the testimony of the Secretary of the Interior on
March 5, 1969,"1 and in the same week the Secretary met in
closed session with the House Interior Committee to discuss the
Channel buffer zone and the possibility of lease recall."' The
Senate held hearings at Santa Barbara on February 24 and 25,"1
and spent the entire day of February 28 questioning the Secretary
and members of his staff."' One special feature that perhaps
on the petroleum industry, see 67 OIL & GAS J., Oct. 13, 1969, at 53; Oct. 20, 1969, at
44; Oct. 27, 1969, at 40.
105. Id., Nov. 3, 1969, at 48; 68 OIL &GAs J., Jan. 12, 1970, at 28.
106. 67 OIL & GAS J., Nov. 3, 1969, at 48.
107. Id. June 9, 1969, at 58.
108. Hearingson S.7 andS.544, at 943.
109. 67 OIL &GAS J., Feb. 24, 1969, at 58.
110. Id., June 9, 1969; at 58.
I11. First Report of the President's Panel on Oil Spills, THE OIL SPILL

PROBLEM,

(Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology, 1969).
112. Second Report of the President's Panel on Oil Spills, Offshore Mineral
Resources: A Challenge and an Opportunity, (Executive Office of the President, Office of
Science and Technology, 1969).
113. Hearingson H.R. 418 and Related Bills Before the House Committee on Public
Works, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at 299.
114. 67 OIL &GAs J., March 17, 1969, at 11.
115. Hearingson S.7 andS.544, part 3.
116. Id. part4, at 942.
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troubled the Senators most was the very small number of
inspection personnel available to the USGS in their offshore
work." 7 For instance, the Pacific Region, which includes Santa
Barbara, had just four men acting as inspectors of the offshore
operations,"' and the Regional Director had stated that, "We
make an attempt to inspect the drilling operation on every well
that is drilled on a Federal lease in the Santa Barbara Channel
at least once during its drilling operation." 1 9
Again in May the Senate heard discussion of the Santa
Barbara problem. This time it was the Interior Committee
hearings on a bill to ban all drilling on federal leases in the Santa
Barbara Channel, to suspend drilling in other areas off the coast
of California, and to direct the Secretary of the Interior to study
whether oil production on the outer continental shelf could
continue without "the threat of pollution and other damage to the
environment and ecological community.""' The bill would also
direct the Secretary to investigate the phasing out of oil
production under federal leases in the Santa Barbara Channel.",
The Interior witnesses testified against the bill saying that they
had already initiated the extensive studies that the bill would call
for and that they were tightening the already existing drilling and
pollution regulations and were proposing new ones which would
provide adequate preventive means and safeguards to protect the
ecology. 2 A House bill would have provided for the cessation of
drilling and production in the Santa Barbara Channel."2
A matter of continuing concern was whether or not new
legislation was needed to cope with oil spills of this type on the
continental shelf. The Secretary felt that he had sufficient
regulatory powers under the existing laws to cope with the
situation. The only change he recommended was the extension of
federal pollution laws over the three-mile-wide state offshore
24

zones.1

117. Id., at 661, 992, 1298.
118. Id., at661.
119. Id., at 672. For recent moves to hire more inspectors, see 68 OIL & GAS J. May
25, 1970 at 41; New York Times, May 13, 1970 at 17, col. 3.
120. Hearings on S.1219, at 1.
121. Id. at 1-2.
122. Id. at44, 61.
123. H.R. 7074. See reference in Hearings on S.1219 at 39. See also, S.3516, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
124. Hearings on S.7 andS.544, at 966, 974.
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There was also reaction to the Santa Barbara spill at the
state level, the most violent of which was understandably in

California where there were series of legislative hearings and
special panels. Initially, the State Land Commission, the body
responsible for drilling oil production within the state jurisdiction
of the three-mile offshore area, suspended drilling operations
everywhere in California. 1 5 Also, the State Attorney General's

Office filed a claim against the Interior Department under the
Federal Torts Claims Act and a lawsuit against the oil
companies. 2 6 In July the Governor approved a long series of new
state regulations which paralleled their federal counterparts. 21 The

appropriate regulatory agencies of Texas and Louisiana also

12 8
upgraded their offshore regulations.

C. Blowouts in the Gulfof Mexico

In a thirteen month period after the Santa Barbara oil spill
there were at least three well blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico."2
The most publicized incident began on an unattended platform

belonging to Chevron Oil which was producing both oil and gas.
On February 10, 1970, an explosion and fire destroyed the
platform and allowed all the wells to run wild.1 31 While the
platform was on fire, any oil which might have caused pollution
was burned off.'3 ' However, after the fire was extinguished four
125. Supra note 120, at 17, 23-24. Statement of Charles A. O'Brien, Chief Deputy
Attorney General, State of California:
I am advised by the division of State lands that pending a full and complete
review of both drilling standards and emergency measures, there is no new
drilling on State-leased offshore drilling platforms. The State has gone further.
It has cancelled the taking of lease bids for offshore parcels. It has canceled
all permits to drill new wells. It has refused permission to carry on any
exploratory activity offshore pending the full and complete review I have
mentioned. The State is exploring every means of assuring that future drilling
operations will proceed with maximum safety. The California State
Legislature is reviewing and acting on numerous bills in this area. Assembly
bill 413 will require the licensing by the State water resources control board
of any chemical or substance used for the cleaning up of oils in the waters of
the State, and will provide that such chemicals may only be used under the
supervision of the State Department of fish and game. Id. at 33.
126. Id. at 34, 37.
127. 67 OIL & GAS J., July 7, 1969, at 100.
128. 67 OIL & GAS J., March 24, 1969, at 83.
129. For an account of these blowouts, see, e.g., 67 OIL & GAS J., March 31, 1969,
March 31, 1969, at 40; 68 OIL & GAS J., January 19, 1970, at 23.
130. Id., Feb. 16, 1970, at 43; Feb. 23, 1970, at 65; March 2, 1970, at 41.
131. Id., Feb. 23, 1970, at 65.
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weeks later,' 32 oil spilled for another three weeks before it was
controlled,1 33 resulting in an approximated release of 12,000
barrels. The "Oil and Gas Journal" called it the largest oil spill
in U.S. history, and the giant oil slicks were a constant threat to
the Louisiana coastline.' 3 That there was not apparent damage to
a large wildlife preserve or to the 1fishing
industry was due to the
3
wind which kept the slick off shore. 1
This last incident is especially relevant to a review of
pollution controls as it highlights a weakness in the U.S. system.
The wells involved in the blowout were found to be lacking in
basic blowout prevention equipment.' In particular, they were
without "storm chokes" which, if present, would have prevented
the spill.137 The Secretary of the Interior ordered a thorough check
of other Chevron equipment in the Gulf and found 347 violations
by Chevron-137 for lack of downhole safety valves and 210 for
breaches of other regulations. The Secretary further disclosed that
in the past six months 17 federal inspectors had checked over
39
3,400 wells and had shut down over 300 for rule violations,
which he considered to be evidence of a pattern of widespread
violation of the federal regulations by oil companies.4 0 He asked
that the Attorney General have a Federal Grand Jury investigate
the situation. 4 ' The Grand Jury began its investigation in New
Orleans on March 31,142 and on May 5 indicted Chevron on
charges of "knowingly and wilfully" failing to install safety
42
devices on its wells.' .1
It would appear from the evidence that this oil spill was not
caused by inadequate regulations, which might have been the case
at Santa Barbara, but by lack of proper inspection and
enforcement. The Senate in its hearings on Santa Barbara had
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id., March 16, 1970, at 97.
Id., April 6, 1970, at 78.
Id.
Id. See also, id., March 30, 1970, at 60; March 23, 1970, at 38.
Id.. March 30, 1970, at 76.

137. Id.
138. Id.

139. Id.
140. Id.

141. Id.
142. Id..
April 6, 1970, at 76.
142.1. Id. May 11, 1970 at 40; New York Times, May 6, 1970 at 1, col. 1.
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already recognized the deficiencies. At that time, however, no
eyidence was present that there was any systematic violation of the
regulations.
V.

APPRAISAL AND RECOMMENDATIONS

All indicators point to the certainty that there will be an ever
increasing development of offshore resources, with many more
coastal nation states tapping their offshore areas in the near
future.14 3 Since the objective is to minimize the oil pollution
menace, for oil spills by their very nature cannot be entirely
eliminated-for instance, accidental pollution from tankers and
natural seepage-it is imperative that all over the world
preventative steps be taken at this stage. Some of these steps will
have to be international while others will be regional, bilateral,
and even unilateral.
The world community has on an international level already
taken laudable first steps in dealing with the hazards of oil
pollution from tankers. The 1954 International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil,' is an example of the
international concern. More recently, in November, 1969, an
international conference amended this convention' and adopted
two other conventions: I) International Convention relating to
Intervention on the High Seas in cases of Oil Pollution
Casualties,' and 2) International Convention on Civil Liability
for Oil Pollution Damage. 47 President Nixon has recently asked
the Senate to approve amendments to the 1954 Convention and
consent to ratification of the two conventions.'47 As was imperative, the Torrey Canyon disaster had
prompted serious, urgent negotiations under the auspices of the
International Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) to
devise ways and means to meet new challenges posed by growing
demands for oil and oil transportation, bigger tankers, and
143. Supranotes 10-13.
144. 12 U.S.T. 2989; T.I.A.S. 4900, 17 U.S.T. 1523, T.I.A.S. 6109 [hereinafter cited
as the 1954 Convention].
145. The amended version is conveniently contained in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1

(1970).
146. Signed at Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969. The text is conveniently contained in 64 Am.
J. INT'L L. 471 (1970).

147. Signed at Brussels, Nov. 29, 1969. The text is conveniently contained in 64 AM.
J. INT'L L. 481 (1970).

147.1. New York Times, May 21, 1970 at I, col. 3; Wall Street Journal, May 21,
1970 at 4, col. 3.
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crowded sea lanes."" Thus these two conventions and the revised

1954 Convention came as a result of an international legal
conference on Marine Pollution Damage convened by IMCO

which met in Brussels from November 10 to November 29,
1969.1'1 The Conference also demonstrated a growing awareness
of pollution hazards from agents other than oil by adopting a

resolution which recommended that 1) contracting states should

"cooperate as appropriate in applying wholly or partially the

provisions of the [1954] Convention;"I 10 and 2) IMCO should
intensify its work in collaboration with other international
organizations, "on all aspects of pollution by agents other than
oil."'' Undoubtedly IMCO, and other interested international
organizations, 52 have a long way to go before providing adequate

safeguards to prevent pollution of the seas and also in providing
adequate compensation to victims of large scale oil pollution

incidents. 15 3 However, these present activities of IMCO, the
recently signed Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning
Liability for Oil Pollution,' 54 and the United Nations concern
expressed recently in a General Assembly resolution 15 and a
report by the Secretary General 1 56 are salutary first steps.

Similarly, recent expressions of concern by U.S. and Canada, 57
148. See generally Comment, Oil Pollution of the Sea, 10 HAR. INT'L L.J. 316, 33238 (1969); Mendelsohn, Maritime Liability for Oil Pollution, 38 GEo. WASH. L.R. 1,27-

29 (1969).
149. For the Final Act of the Conference, see 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 20 (1970).
150. Id. at 65.

151. Id.
152. For example, the following organizations participated in the Brussels
Conference: International Labor Organization; International Atomic Energy Agency;
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law; Committee Maritime International; International Chamber of
Shipping; International Chamber of Commerce; Permanent International Association of
Navigation Congresses; International Law Association; and International Confederation
of Free Trade Unions. Id. at 21-22.
153. However, see id. at 66-67, for the text of a resolution adopted at the Brussels
conference on Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil Pollution
Damage.
154. 8 INr'L LEGAL MATERIALS 497 (1969).
155. G.A. Res. 2566 (XXIV), contained in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 424 (1970)
(Unanimously adopted on Dec. 13, 1969).
156. Note by the Secretary-General, Study on Marine Pollution which might arise
from the exploration and exploitation of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil
thereofbeyond the limits ofnationaljurisdiction, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/13 (1969).
157. Letter on risks of oil pollution in Lake Erie, sent to the Chairman of the
International Joint Commission, contained in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 627 (1969). See
also Jordan, Recent Developments in International Environmental Pollution Control, 15

McGILL L.J. 279 (1969).
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and multilateral arrangements, such as the 1969 Agreement for
cooperation in dealing with Pollution of the North Sea by Oil,' s
to prevent and combat pollution of waters, show desirable
tendencies.
Compared with the bilateral and multilateral arrangements
mentioned above, unilateral steps will be essential in dealing with
offshore production. Offshore activities have grown so rapidly
over such a short span of time that laws have lagged behind
technological developments. For instance, a review of the offshore
legislation of the Caribbean countries points to a consistent lack
in providing well articulated regulations necessary to confront
pollution hazards. 59 The Jamaican Agreement of December 20,
1966, between the government of Jamaica and Signal Exploration
(Jamaica) Company160 typifies the provisions in which such rules
are often generalized. It says:
Pollutionand Explosive
7. (1) The Licensee shall adopt all practicable
precautions (which shall include the provisions of modern
equipment) to prevent pollution of the coastal waters by oil,
mud or any other fluid or substance which might contaminate
the sea water or shoreline.
(2) The Licensee of a submarine area shall, before
using explosive in connection with seismic operations on the
sea bed, obtain the approval of the Commissioner of Mines.'
By no means would the Caribbean be unique in lacking
effective safeguards. Perhaps most developing countries are
primarily concerned with economic growth and for good reasons.
But unfortunately economic growth, defined in terms of
immediate financial gains, rather than overall long-term
development, takes precedence, and attractive royalties from
offshore productions are likely to outshine a concern for
ecological balance. However, the safeguards are not prohibitive.
They will not even impose unnecessary hardships, nor are they
likely to discourage further exploration since petroleum products
are enjoying an ever increasing demand.
158. Contained in 9 INT'L

LEGAL MATERIALS

159. Petroleum Legislation,

359 (1970).

CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN-BASIC OIL LAWS

(1967); and id. Supplements l-X.
160. Id., Supplement No. IX, A-O (1969).

AND CONCESSION CONTRACTS

161. Id., at A-11.
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As a rough model, each nation state should establish an
Offshore Resource Agency. The proposed Agency's role would be
to grant and administer offshore leases and to regulate and
supervise the production of resources. The Agency will be guided
by offshore legislation which could be fruitfully modeled on the
United States legislation. While the legislation should be fairly
flexible to meet challenges of changing technology and changing
conditions, it should specifically contain the following provisions
on pollution control: 1) Imposition of an absolute liability for at
least clean up operations and perhaps for damages too, resulting
from pollution caused by any individual or company involved in
offshore production; 2) A broad discretion of the Agency to
prescribe and amend all rules and regulations as it deems
necessary to provide for the prevention of waste and conservation
of offshore resources; and 3) Provision for compulsory
adjudicatory process to determine fault in pollution incidents to
allow the individual or the company initially held liable to recover
costs of clean up or damages from any other person or company
that might have negligently caused the pollution.
The Agency's regulatory and supervisory functions should
include the power to set regulations on all phases of oil well
drilling and oil and gas production, for the legislation cannot be
too specific and this regulatory power should allow for necessary
variations in different situations. Regulations should specifically
contain oil drilling and pollution prevention procedures such as
those concerning well casing, cementing, and testing requirements;
blow-out prevention devices and periodic blowout prevention tests;
standby pollution control equipment such as chemical dispersants,
booms, etc.; periodic installation, testing, and maintenance of
well safety devices; pollution inspections; drilling mud
characteristics and mud testing equipment; equipment and testing
procedures for producing wells; procedures for reporting leakage
of oil and liquid pollutants and oil spills; and standards for the
construction of offshore structures. Enforcement machinery
should be clearly set forth. Power to suspend or cancel leases
should be entrusted to the Resource Agency.
As a special feature, the model should ensure adequate
consideration of all ecological factors before any lease is granted.
In the United States, following the Santa Barbara spill, three
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important steps have been taken to ensure adequate protection of
the environment: 1) The public will be consulted before letting
leases. The purpose is to provide opportunities to all concerned to
have a voice before a decision is made concerning the development
of offshore resources; 2) Companies will be asked to disclose the
pertinent geological and engineering information before leases are
granted; and 3) The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
was adopted which provides for establishing a Council on
Environmental Quality and declares the Federal Government
policy "to create and maintain conditions under which men and
62
nature can exist in productive harmony."'
It may not be possible in many countries to have an elaborate
machinery for holding hearings, or perhaps there may be a lack
of enough awareness, rendering such hearings meaningless. Thus
it is submitted that the presently available UN machinery on
regional levels-Economic Commissions for regions, for instance,
or some other appropriate body-should provide the requesting
nation with competent expertise to study the ecological aspects of
the area involved.
Each state should also establish a board on oil pollution
which should have the operational responsibility to monitor and
control oil spills. Finally, the machinery envisaged herein is to
have sufficient flexibility with built-in self-evaluation devices and
provisions for periodic reviews so that it is capable of meeting
contingencies. Since there are no guarantees against future
blowouts, regulatory steps at this stage to minimize pollution
hazards and to ensure efficient exploitation are in the common
interest.
162. 83 Stat. 852, Public Law 91-190, 91st Cong., S.1075, Jan. 1, 1970.

